The Shapley value for directed graph games
Khmelnitskaya,A. Selçuk,Ozer Talman,Dolf
Khmelnitskaya,A.
Selçuk,Ozer
Talman,Dolf
Abstract
The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) TU games with limited cooperation induced by a digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players is introduced. It is defined as the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations which do not violate the induced subordination of players. We study properties of this solution and its core stability. For digraph games with the digraphs being directed cycles an axiomatization of the solution is obtained.
Description
Date
2016-01-01
Journal Title
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Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
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Keywords
TU game, Shapley value, Directed graph, Dominance structure, Core, Convexity
Citation
Khmelnitskaya, A, Selçuk, O & Talman, D 2016, 'The Shapley value for directed graph games', Operations Research Letters, vol. 44, no. 1, 1, pp. 143-147. https://doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.orl.2015.12.009