Step out-step in sequencing games
Musegaas,Marieke Borm,Peter Quant,Marieke
Musegaas,Marieke
Borm,Peter
Quant,Marieke
Abstract
In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class of Step out–Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to step in at any position later in the processing order. First, we show that if the value of a coalition in a relaxed sequencing game is bounded from above by the gains made by all possible neighbor switches, then the game has a non-empty core. After that, we show that this is the case for Step out –Step in sequencing games. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time algorithm to determine the values of the coalitions in Step out–Step in sequencing games
Description
Date
2015-11-01
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
(Cooperative) game theory, Sequencing games, Core
Citation
Musegaas, M, Borm, P & Quant, M 2015, 'Step out-step in sequencing games', European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 246, no. 3, pp. 894 - 906. https://doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2015.05.045
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess