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Carbon is forever: A climate change experiment on cooperation

Calzolari,Giacomo
; 
Casari,Marco
; 
Ghidoni,Riccardo
Abstract
Greenhouse gases generate impacts that can last longer than human civilization itself. Such persistence may affect the behavioral ability to cooperate. In a laboratory experiment, we study mitigation efforts with dynamic externalities in a framework that reflects key features of climate change. In treatments with persistence, pollution cumulates and generates damages over time, while in another treatment it has only immediate effects and then disappears. We show that with pollution persistence, cooperation is initially high but then systematically deteriorates with high stocks of pollution.
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Date
2018-11-01
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
Dynamic games, Inequality, Public goods, Stock externalities, SDG 13 - Climate Action
Citation
Calzolari, G, Casari, M & Ghidoni, R 2018, 'Carbon is forever : A climate change experiment on cooperation', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 92, pp. 169-184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.09.002
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/69742
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