Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation
Reuben,E. Suetens,S.
Reuben,E.
Suetens,S.
Abstract
We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategically- and non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the observed pattern of cooperation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame effect. Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic.
Description
Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2009-022
Date
2012
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
Repeated games, Cooperation, Reputation building, Strong reciprocity, C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles, D70 - General
Citation
Reuben, E & Suetens, S 2012, 'Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation', Experimental Economics, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 24-43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9286-4
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess